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blue-collar or decidedly middle-class
background, mostly from farms or small
towns. Their story is an important one,
and the first-person accounts of individual sacrifice and aircrew heroism are a
needed addition to the narrative of the
Navy’s nearly forgotten war in the Mekong
Delta.
WILLIAM M. CALHOUN

Naval War College

Gentile, Gian P. How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?
Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo. New
York: New York Univ. Press, 2001. 273pp. $36

The issue of strategic bombing’s effectiveness is vitally important to political
and military leaders. U.S. Air Force doctrine has argued for decades that
airpower’s ability to operate directly and
immediately at the strategic level of war
is its unique and defining characteristic—a characteristic that must be exploited. Many disagree, so the debates
have been long and heated.
Gian Gentile, a serving Army officer, now
adds to the literature on this important
subject. Unfortunately, he never really
comes to grips with the key issue of effectiveness implied by the title of his book.
Rather, he has chosen to replow some old
ground, looking anew at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), chartered
by President Franklin Roosevelt to examine and report on the effects of strategic
bombing in World War II. Measuring
bombing’s effectiveness and examining
the workings of the USSBS that studied
bomb effects are two different things.
The story of USSBS has been told before.
In many ways it is a typical tale of wartime America. A need is identified, resources and personnel are mobilized, vast
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amounts of energy and material are expended, and notable gains are achieved.
At the same time, the path to success is
not a straight line—there is much inefficiency, debate, and compromise. Sausage
is being made.
Gentile does not contest the findings of
USSBS. Indeed, virtually no one has attempted to do so in the five-plus decades
since they were released. The reason is
simple: no one has the time, stamina, resources, or expertise to review the mountain of data collected and analyzed by the
thousand individuals who conducted the
USSBS.
Instead, Gentile seeks to discredit the
survey’s findings by revealing flaws and
inconsistencies in the survey itself. Primarily, he argues that Army Air Forces
(AAF) leaders were so interested in forming a separate air force after the war that
they induced bias into the USSBS. He is
unable to make this charge stick. The
survey was led by noted industrialists,
bankers, economists, lawyers, and other
professionals, most of whom had had little or no direct involvement with aviation prior to their work with the survey.
Gentile admits that General Henry “Hap”
Arnold, the AAF commander, stressed to
these civilian leaders the need for objectivity, impartiality, and truth in the survey’s findings. Yet he treats such
admonitions as duplicitous, despite the
statement by the USSBS head that “at no
time has there been the slightest inclination to interfere with us.”
In truth, it is difficult to imagine that
men like John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul
Nitze, and George Ball could have been
manipulated and pressured to distort
their findings. Common sense and logic
tell us it is more likely that these
men—and their hundreds of colleagues
on the survey— examined thousands of
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documents, interviewed hundreds of witnesses, visited scores of bombed sites,
and then concluded that strategic bombing had indeed been a decisive factor in
the Allied victory, as they reported.
Alas, such a conclusion is unacceptable
to Gentile. He must find nefarious
schemes and schemers, and so he repeatedly questions the motives and veracity
of the participants. For example, when
General Curtis LeMay testified before
Congress that he did not believe airpower
could “win the war” and that a balanced
mix of land, sea, and air forces was necessary for victory, Gentile dismisses his
statement as a “shrewd and bureaucratically astute” tactic to manipulate his civilian superiors.
The USSBS has been controversial ever
since it was written. Small wonder—attempting to measure the effects of strategic bombing in World War II was a
massive undertaking, conducted at a time
when the techniques of systems analysis
were in their infancy. Gentile finds it
troubling that survey members were not
in total agreement. This should hardly
come as a surprise. If the unfolding of
historical events were simple and uncontested, our libraries would be far smaller.
His concluding chapter, dealing with the
survey that analyzed the air campaign of
the Persian Gulf War, is less tendentious.
Here again, however, the author presents
little that is new, and, more importantly,
he does not attempt to address the book’s
ostensible focus—the efficacy of strategic
bombing.
Measuring the effectiveness of strategic
air attack is one of the greatest challenges
facing military planners today. It is an
enormously complex and difficult problem that defies easy solution. Yet as
airpower becomes increasingly dominant
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as a foreign-policy tool, such measurement is essential. This poorly reasoned
and highly parochial book will not help
us find answers to that pressing need, nor
will it foster understanding among the
services.
PHILLIP S. MEILINGER

Science Applications International Corporation
McLean, Va.

Jordan, Robert S. Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander—Airman, Strategist, Diplomat.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 329pp. $49

Lauris Norstad was a major Air Force
leader during the defining years of the
Cold War, and except for Dwight Eisenhower, he was the most prominent of all
the Supreme Allied Commanders Europe
(SACEUR) since that position was established in early 1951. Surprisingly, up to
now, nothing definitive had been written
on his role as SACEUR. Robert Jordan, a
professor at the University of New Orleans and an authority on Nato, has filled
that gap.
Norstad grew up in a small town in Minnesota and graduated from West Point in
the class of 1930. Transferring to the Air
Corps in 1931, he was one of that relatively small group of regular-officer aviators who provided air force leadership
during World War II. When the war began, Major Norstad was serving on an air
staff in Washington, D.C. He came to the
attention of General Henry “Hap” Arnold,
who headed what had become in June
1941 the Army Air Forces. In 1942 Arnold
established a select group of young officers, the brightest he could find, to work
in his immediate office. Norstad was one
of them—he was on the way up.
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